African Conflict Resolution Act Interagency Progress Report For Fiscal Years 1997/1998

U.S. Agency for International Development
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African Conflict Resolution Act Progress Report for Fiscal Years 1997/1998

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A. Introduction

Africa is at a crossroad in its political and economic development. The potential for continued political and economic reform, and the stability and prosperity that these reforms can bring, remains strong. However serious threats to consolidation of these achievements remain, including continuing conflicts in several countries such as Rwanda, Burundi, Somalia, Angola, and Sudan. The UN reports that in 1996, over one-quarter of the countries in Africa were affected by armed conflict, which accounted for more than half of all war-related deaths worldwide and resulted in more than 8 million refugees, returnees, and displaced persons.

In 1997, Africa experienced its highest number of devastating conflicts in several years, in contrast to other parts of the world. Although conflicts in the world as a whole declined from 1996 to 1997, all new conflicts in 1997 were in Africa: Burundi, Congo, Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Since the end of 1997, a border conflict has broken out between Eritrea and Ethiopia, and a return to conflict appears to be possible in Angola. Further, Africa has the highest proportion of "high intensity" conflicts (over 1,000 conflict related deaths in a year) in the world. Clearly, support for conflict prevention, mitigation and resolution in Africa must continue to be a high

priority for the international community.

In recent years, much of this conflict has been intra-state rather than between states, although the spillover effects of such crises to bordering states have been substantial. These ongoing conflicts redirect

"Conflict prevention,
mediation, and
demobilization are
prerequisites to the success of
development assistance
programs. Nutrition and
education programs cannot
succeed in a nation at war."

Text of Africa Conflict Resolution Act resources, including official development assistance, away from development programs to emergency needs, which further impacts the ability of these states to develop economically and ensure long-term prosperity and political stability.

The U.S. Government sees such conflict as the cause of "untold economic and social damage to the countries of Africa which threatens political and economic stability in Africa while diverting scarce resources from development needs."

This report highlights USG-funded programs in support of conflict resolution in Africa, including programs in preventative diplomacy, conflict mediation, peacekeeping operations, capacity building of African organizations working in conflict resolution, support for human rights, demobilization and retraining of ex-combatants, arms control and activities to reduce arms trafficking, and demining and hazard awareness programs. Additional USG assistance is provided in areas where conflict frequently arises. Support is provided for disaster relief, transitional elections, refugees, victims of war, as well as poverty relief.

In addition, the report also focuses on three countries which best exemplify the intent of the African Conflict Resolution Act, to coordinate with multilateral institutions and other bilateral donors to build African capacity for conflict resolution both to enable Africans to address their own needs in conflict prevention and mitigation, and to ensure the success of other development assistance. Angola, Liberia, and Rwanda provide three examples where there has been significant activity toward these goals, with varying levels of impact, and important lessons learned.

This is the fourth annual report of the activities related to the 1995 Interagency Plan developed in accordance with the

African Conflict Resolution Act (PL 103-381). It has several objectives:

- * To provide a summary of USG activities which fall under the Act;
- * To inform Congress and the U.S. public;
- * To inform other donors and development partners of USG efforts in this area; and
- * To highlight achievements and results which illustrate the utility of such efforts in Africa

B. Overview - Results Achieved

U.S. support for programs which address conflict prevention, mitigation, and resolution in Africa has contributed to some notable successes. An inventory of activities which have been carried out in support of the Act can be found in Annex A. Some highlights include:

1) Improving Conflict Resolution Capabilities of the Organization of African Unity (OAU).

- # Establishment of a Conflict Management Center within the OAU headquarters in Addis Ababa. The Center's staff are working on crisis throughout the continent. A ten-day, comprehensive crises management exercise was held at the Center in late April 1998.
- # Support for an OAU 100-man quick reaction military observer force. This observer force has been deployed by the OAU to the Comoros Islands to monitor tensions following an attempt by two

of the islands to secede from the Comoros Republic. The OAU also has a 10-person civilian monitoring group in Western Sahara as observers in the run-up to a referendum in that country.

2) Improving the Conflict Resolution Capability of Sub-Regional Organizations.

- # Support was provided to the Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) to promote the peace process in Somalia and Sudan, and the peace talks in Burundi. In addition, support was provided to develop IGAD's Peace Fund, a quick response conflict management mechanism which will facilitate IGAD's increasingly critical role in mediating and preventing conflicts in the region.
- # Support for the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in its efforts to negotiate the peaceful restoration of constitutional order in Sierra Leone.

3) Improving Conflict Resolution Capabilities of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs).

- # In South Africa, support was provided to several local NGOs, including the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) and the Independent Mediation Services of South Africa (IMSSA), for conflict mediation and management training which targeted some of the most violence prone areas in South Africa, such as KwaZulu-Natal.
- 4) Supporting African Demobilization and Retraining Efforts.

- # In Angola, support was provided to efforts to demobilize UNITA soldiers in accordance with the Lusaka Protocol. With USG assistance, more than 70,000 former UNITA soldiers (ex-FMU) were demobilized in 1997.
- # In Liberia, in accordance with the Abuja Peace
 Agreement of August, 1996, international donors
 and UN agencies pledged assistance that helped
 transform demobilized fighters into civilians.
 The USG supported several activities including:
 assistance to child soldiers and other
 disadvantaged youths; and training programs for
 ex-fighters and civilians in tailoring,
 shoe-making, carpentry, and plumbing. (Note: the
 assistance to demobilized fighters has been
 minimal with very few receiving training that
 would allow them to make a living.)

5) Training for Africans in Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping.

Through the African Crisis Response Initiative
(ACRI) the U.S. offers training and equipment to
African countries with a commitment to
peacekeeping and in which the military accepts
the supremacy of democratic, civilian government.
In 1997 initial training with battalion sized
contingents from Senegal, Uganda, and Malawi was
completed. At the conclusion of FY 1998, the
initiative will have provided six ACRI partner
countries (Senegal, Mali, Uganda, Ghana, Malawi,
and Benin) with interoperable communications and
other peacekeeping support equipment (all nonlethal), and completed initial training of six
battalions. Initial training for an additional

battalion in Benin and Ivory Coast will be completed within calendar year 1998.

- # December 1997 An initial meeting of the African Peacekeeping Support Group was held in New York and attended by 80 member states to exchange information on initiatives to enhance African peacekeeping and humanitarian relief capacities.
- # May 1998 A second meeting of the Africa Peacekeeping Support Group to discuss training and equipment for peacekeeping operations was held with donors and troop contributors.

The next section presents three cases which illustrate the tremendous impact that even small scale activities and initiatives in conflict resolution can have on the prospects for successful political transitions and sustainable democratic development. In all three cases, activities which were carried out under the Act had meaningful effects on the course of events in these countries.

C. Case Studies

I. Liberia

Introduction

In July 1997, Liberia held presidential and legislative elections which formalized the transition to a democratically elected, unified and internationally recognized government. While there is still much to be done, Liberia has made some progress toward establishing peace and stability, laying the foundation for a democratic government, and revitalizing its economy.

Assisting Liberia has been a challenge to the international community. After seven years of extensive and brutal conflict, 13 failed peace accords, and over \$500 million in U.S. humanitarian assistance, Liberia is now transitioning to democracy. Since the signing of the Abuja II Peace Accords in August 1996, the U.S. government has worked with the European Union, other donors, and the UN system to promote compliance with the accords. Key factors in securing peace and promoting respect for human and civil rights were the demobilization of the warring factions and the initiation of the electoral process that helped produce a legitimate government.

USG Activities Contributing to Conflict Resolution in Liberia

The USG (through USAID, DOD and the State Department) provided support for demobilization and reintegration activities, a critical component of the larger conflict mitigation effort. Prior to FY 1997, the emergency food aid program focused on meeting the immediate food needs during the civil war. In 1997, however, the Title II program, which supplies 85% of all food aid in Liberia and covers half the population, shifted its focus to promoting rural resettlement through programs designed to increase food crop production, rehabilitate health and education facilities, and rebuild infrastructure. As peace, security and disarmament were achieved in rural Liberia, the Title II program shifted its focus from emergency feeding to supporting resettlement in rural communities. The result of this activity was that, of the 350,000 persons remaining in official displaced camps who received food rations at the start of FY 1997, more than 100,000 had permanently resettled in rural areas by February 1998. This is in addition to a large number of undocumented displaced persons and refugees who returned to their homes. When completed, this process of resettlement (which is still ongoing) will remove one of the major pressures and instigators of conflict at the community level.

On another level, complementary activities were implemented which focused on leveling the playing field for elections through the introduction just prior to elections of independent, non-factionalized radio coverage to all geographic locations in Liberia and border areas; support for the demobilization process and employment creation for ex-fighters; and assistance to support compliance with the peace accord by strengthening the enforcement of sanctions, all of which directly contributed to the mitigation of conflict in Liberia.

In 1997, ICITAP, with USG support, trained 500 members of the Liberian National Police (LNP) to prepare them to assist ECOMOG peacekeeping forces in providing security for the national elections, which were held in July, 1997. Concerns that candidates for the Election Security Police (ESP) might be former human rights violators or common criminals who could intimidate potential voters were addressed through a rigorous vetting process to ensure that officers with questionable backgrounds were excluded from consideration. Training courses were given on a variety of topics including, "The Role of Police in a Democracy, " "Human Dignity, " "Defensive Tactics, " "Community Policing," and "Media Relations." The training focused on imparting the necessary knowledge and skills to provide security and protection at the voting sites, and also to give the ESP officers the initiative to guide and assist pedestrian traffic and the movement of voters. During the training, a profound change in the attitude and confidence level of the trainees was observed. This enthusiasm and confidence had a profoundly positive effect on public attitudes toward the forthcoming elections, reversing the mood of public cynicism about elections which had been evident previously. A refresher course for the trainees was held two days before the elections, and the ESP forces subsequently did an outstanding job of maintaining order at polling places during the national elections. At the Presidential inauguration, ESP forces

continued to play a highly visible role as part of the honor guard with ECOMOG welcoming the arrival of the eight African heads of state and the members of Congress who comprised the U.S. presidential delegation to the inauguration.

The United States Information Service (USIS) worked on the civil society aspect of conflict resolution through workshops and seminars conducted in Monrovia. The participants, from different ethnic groups, are involved in national reconciliation issues, human rights, and social welfare problems. An example of an activity was a workshop on "Managing Conflict for a Sustainable Democracy: New Skills and Techniques, " which was conducted by USIS and received rave reviews from the participants who agreed that the techniques could be effective at all levels of society and government. This and other programs are vitally important to countries devastated by years of civil strife that are now trying to resolve ethnic problems without resorting to violence. Other examples of workshops include a forum on Government-Media Relations in Liberia held in Monrovia in August, 1997. Led by a U.S. speaker, Steven Goodman, the workshop, "Government and the Media: Working Together to Rebuild Liberia, " went a long way to dispel mistrust and build confidence among the participants. A series of positive newspaper and radio reports followed the program.

UNDP received USG funding to implement projects in support of Liberia's National Recovery Program. It is working with returned refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) to implement over 366 projects in FY97/98. Activities include refurbishing schools, clinics and medical facilities; repair of access and farm-to-market roads; and agricultural activities as well as more socially oriented activities, i.e. community organizations, public forums, and conflict resolution workshops to strengthen civil society at the local level. To date, 68 micro-projects have started including eight road repairs, 31 educational, 10 health, seven agricultural, seven

water/sanitation, and five others. These activities contributed, both directly and indirectly, to conflict resolution in Liberia by providing a basis for the return to normalcy in the post-conflict era, and encouraging the transition to a democratic and participatory society.

Finally, there were several USG diplomatic activities which contributed to conflict resolution in Liberia, including frequent contact by Ambassador Milam with Liberian factional and political leaders and ECOWAS/ECOMOG regarding combatant disarmament and demobilization as well as election preparations. The Ambassador continues his contact with key Liberian political figures to urge national reconciliation and inclusion of opposition voices in Government. Special Envoy Howard Jeter helped conceive and participated extensively in UN-sponsored Special Conferences on Liberia which focussed international attention on and generated donor assistance for the peace process, including the July 1997 elections; and Jeter worked closely with the International Contact Group on Liberia, bringing important support from the EU and Japan to bear in resolving the Liberian conflict. Special Presidential Envoy Jesse Jackson visited Liberia in mid-February to reinforce the message of dialogue and political compromise among former factional foes and political enemies. A high-level Inter-Agency Team visited Liberia in March, 1997, to define the bilateral relationship, which included a message encouraging national reconciliation.

Conclusions

Civil war in Liberia has been replaced by peace, which has already produced a dividend in the form of renewed business and retail activities, increased foreign presence and representation, and modest investments in infrastructure to repair roads, schools, clinics and other public and private facilities. In addition to increased economic activity and

investments, the end of the war offers the first real prospect in the past 10 years for the U.S. and the international community to work with the Government of Liberia and its people to move the country toward sound political and economic policies and sustainable development.

The USG has played a key role in returning this war-torn country to peace and in providing it the opportunity to develop viable democratic institutions, move toward sound economic policies and an open, market-driven economy. Our assistance has given the Liberian people, who suffered much over the past eight years, an opportunity to free themselves from civil conflict and near total dependence on the donor community, and an opportunity to get back on their feet. While the road ahead may not be fully clear or assured, it is pointing in the right direction. Supporting Liberia's progress is clearly preferable to allowing the country to lose the precarious ground that has been gained recently through great sacrifice by the Liberian people and at substantial cost to the international community.

2. Rwanda

Introduction

Rwanda's challenges are truly unique. As noted recently by the U.S. Committee for Refugees: "rarely in human history has a society asked - insisted - that all its people live together again, side by side, in the aftermath of genocide. That is, however, the task at hand in Rwanda. The country and its people are seeking to endure as one. A society torn apart by an attempt to obliterate an entire group is attempting to reestablish the trust needed to carry on."

Rwanda can currently be characterized by apparent political stability built around a strongly centralized government.

Central government power is tempered by the National Transition Assembly which, though not elected, is appointed from various political parties based on provisions in the Arusha Accords. Those Accords project a five year transitional period for the present governmental structure, which began with the military victory of the Rwandan Patriotic Front and the installation of the present government in July, 1994. We anticipate that the transition period will be extended. However, local level elections are likely to occur in the interim. The need to bring 130,000 detainees accused of genocide to justice continues to be a major constraint to a more open and participatory political process. An even deeper constraint is the lack of trust that permeates all parts of society.

With the massive return of the refugees and soldiers/militia from the former genocidal regime in late 1996 and early 1997, political violence worsened in 1997, principally in the northwest prefectures of Gisenyi and Ruhengeri. The outbreak of violence was facilitated by the GOR's open border policy for the return of the refugees, as armed insurgents reentered with innocent refugees.

High civilian casualties persist. The Rwandan Army has been unable to quell continuing terrorist attacks by the insurgents, who engage in human rights violations. Excessive use of force by government troops in response to the insurgency has also caused civilian casualties. Throughout the country there is a pervasive need to rebuild confidence and trust among neighbors and in local and national institutions. A strong undercurrent of suspicion and uncertainty undermines attempts at reconciliation.

USG Activities Contributing to Conflict Resolution in Rwanda

A primary USG focus in Rwanda is helping Rwandans further national reconciliation. Programs and activities by USAID, in

partnership with the Department of State and the Department of Justice, include initiatives which help to prevent renewed conflict and pave the way for development after the transition. The programs concentrate on providing assistance to Rwandans to deal with the aftermath of the genocide, to improve the sense of security in the countryside, and to expand the political marketplace. There are three inter-related project areas to meet these objectives:

- * Justice: to restore confidence in the Rwandan judicial system; document and monitor past human rights abuses and hopefully prevent future abuse. Activities include supporting the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and helping reestablish a sense of personal security.
- * Women: to support the role of women as agents of change in transitional societies because the number of female-headed households rose sharply following the 1994 genocide and because women are increasingly playing a significant role in rebuilding Rwandan society. Support is provided to community improvement projects implemented by women's organizations which address the critical needs of the community and support the empowerment of women within those communities.
- * Decentralization: to provide technical assistance to the Government of Rwanda to decentralize political authority in order to increase political participation and participatory decision-making at the local level.

In Rwanda, public confidence in peace and democracy has been promoted through: support for over 200 human rights field officers (although the Human Rights field office closed in mid-1998); expanding the roles of women through a partnership which addresses the community's most practical needs through local

multi-ethnic women's groups; the Women in Transition project, which has provided close to 300 grants to grassroots women's associations, has invigorated a nationwide network of local groups that are now providing a central organizing mechanism for community-based housing and income generating activities; a conference funded by USAID on genocide that has resulted in new legislation that will address 70,000 prison detainees; and radio reports broadcast nation-wide from the ICTR genocide trials in Arusha.

The Department of Justice has supported the development of a professional civilian police force in Rwanda which is essential if Rwanda hopes to break the cycle of ethnic violence and establish a stable democracy based on the rule of law and respect for human rights and dignity. Justice and reconciliation will not be possible without a disciplined, trained police force to help resettle returning refugees and maintain day-to-day order. This is particularly true at the local level where the Bourgemestre and the Communal Police are responsible for resettlement and social reconciliation. The police forces in Rwanda need to expand in order to deal with the immense responsibilities they face. At the request of the State Department, ICITAP began working with USAID and the Government of Rwanda (GOR) to implement a police development project in April, 1996. ICITAP coordinated an implementation strategy with police representatives from the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Germany, Canada, Uganda, and the United Nations that focused on Rwanda's two police forces, the National Gendarmerie and the smaller Communal Police. Programs were to focus on developing curriculum for basic recruit training, training for criminal investigators, organizational development and training for midlevel police officers.

The goal was to assist the Rwandan Gendarmerie and Communal police forces to respond effectively to the nation's need for refugee resettlement and national reconciliation in a manner

that would uphold the highest professional and ethical standards, and would respect the human rights and dignity of all Rwandans.

Through the DOJ, ICITAP sponsored Rwandan officials on a study tour of the U.S., including meetings and tours of police departments in Washington, D.C., California, Texas, Arizona, and Virginia. The focus was on observing U.S. law enforcement training, training facilities, and the actual day-to-day operation of local, state and federal police agencies. Assistance was provided to develop a police curriculum, which was approved and implemented by the GOR in both police training academies. As a result, police training in Rwanda became more focused and disciplined. This program made an important contribution toward the maintenance of stability in Rwanda. Graduates of the Communal Police training played an important role in facilitating the safe return of over two million refugees who fled to neighboring countries after the 1994 genocide. At the same time, these programs helped to develop competence and a feeling of professional pride within the ranks of the Rwandan police.

Other notable accomplishments have included activities designed to increase dialogue about conflict mediation between the various Rwandan groups. Examples of such activities include a post-genocide policy conference and follow-up activities, and a seminar in Kigali on "Power, Politics and Natural Resources in the Great Lakes-Congo Area," which included attendance by a capacity audience of government officials, NGO workers and journalists. Coverage of the conference on Rwandan national television resulted, and the dialogue was the basis for a story in the national newspapers.

In her December, 1997, trip to Africa, Secretary Albright articulated the following USG policy objectives in the Great Lakes region: to support peace and the rule of law, promote good

governance and democracy, and encourage economic development and integration. The Secretary announced \$30 million in U.S. support for a Great Lakes Justice Initiative (GLJI), whose ultimate objective is to end the culture of impunity. The legacy of the recent genocide and the continuing violence and absence of the rule of law are clearly the region's overarching challenges. On his recent visit to Rwanda, President Clinton reaffirmed the USG commitment of \$30 million for the GLJI while elaborating on the Initiative's themes of shared responsibility and African ownership. The President also announced that the U.S. would contribute \$2 million to the GOR's newly-established Genocide Survivors Fund, to which the GOR has committed 5% of the national budget. The GLJI will help the public and private sector in Rwanda to develop a justice system that is impartial, credible and effective, and to support efforts to promote inclusiveness, coexistence and security. Given the on-going USAID democracy and governance program with the Government of Rwanda and the existing legislative restrictions on assistance to DROC and Burundi, it is anticipated that Rwanda will be the initial focus of the GLJI, which will be funded beginning in FY99 from ESF monies.

Conclusions

Although the situation in Rwanda remains tenuous, it is clear that USG assistance has provided a foundation on which the country can begin to move away from the genocidal conflict of its recent past and toward a more sustainable political and economic future. Serious obstacles to this process remain, including demographic shifts affecting as much as one-half of the population, resettlement and rehabilitation needs in all parts of the country, and a huge loss of human resources whether through flight, participation in genocide, or death.

Fundamentally, it remains an open question whether Rwandans can recover from the polarizing effects of years of ethnocentric rule culminating in the genocide. However, progress is being

made on a number of fronts, including improved rule of law and personal security. USG efforts remain a critical part of this ongoing transition process.

3. Angola

The USG gives high priority to bringing the Angolan peace process to a successful conclusion, and US efforts were largely successful in securing peace until very recently. Although there had been no significant fighting for several years, the longest period of peace Angola has enjoyed in decades, recent events raise concerns about a backslide into conflict. The war in Angola stopped in late 1994 with the implementation of the cease-fire subsequent to the signature of the Lusaka Protocol. Since that time, the "Government of Unity and National Reconciliation" has been put into place with UNITA occupying 11 Ministerial and Vice-Ministerial posts. However both the government and the Parliament are institutionally weak, civil society can only be described as nascent, and corruption continues to be rampant.

The Government of Unity and National Reconciliation (GURN) was formed in April, 1997, when the four UNITA-appointed Ministers and seven Vice Ministers took up their cabinet portfolios and the 70 UNITA parliamentarians took their seats in the 220-seat National Assembly. UNITA's joining the Government and the Parliament was the most important political achievement of the period. The March, 1998, legalization of UNITA as a political party and the promulgation of UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi's special status as leader of the largest opposition party cleared the way for legal UNITA activity throughout the country. The Parliament has been invigorated by UNITA's taking its seats and has shaken off some of its reputation as a rubber stamp body. On March 6, 1998, the GRA and UNITA agreed to an ambitious timetable to complete all remaining actions under the Lusaka Protocol by April 1, 1998, including:

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# Demobilization of residual UNITA forces (completed);
# Demobilization of UNITA general officers (completed);
# Extension of state administration to Sautar, Luquembo and
Quirima (completed);
# UNITA's declaration of complete demilitarization (completed);
# Government legalization of UNITA as a political party
(completed);
# Agreement on the structure of Savimbi's bodyguard (completed);
# Demobilization and integration of Savimbi's 400-person
bodyguard into ANP (completed);
# Government promulgation of UNITA leader's special status
(completed);
# Nomination of UNITA governors, vice-governors and ambassadors
(governors and vice-governors nominated);
# Cessation of Radio Vorgan broadcasting (completed);
# Transfer of UNITA leadership to Luanda (pending);
# Extension of state administration to Andulo, Bailundo,
Mussende, Nharea, and Mungo (pending).
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While many of these actions were completed, some critically important ones were not. In early 1998, progress on the peace process was encouraging, particularly due to the proactive interventions of the USG and the UN Security Council. However, the situation has deteriorated somewhat, as the GURN and UNITA have been unable to resolve lingering compliance issues surrounding the 1994 accords. Escalation of rhetoric between the two has been followed by the reoccupation of territory by UNITA and a return to some fighting. The death of the UN Secretary General's Special Representative for Angola in June removed an important catalyst for ensuring a peaceful resolution between the parties. Finally, the August 31, 1998, suspension of UNITA members from the National Assembly and the GURN was a serious setback to the Lusaka Peace Process.

USG Activities Contributing to Conflict Resolution in Angola

The USG objective is to promote Angola's transition from a devastated war-torn country to a stable, peaceful and democratic society. As part of this process, activities are underway which strengthen the institutional base for national reconciliation. The USG, through USAID, directly supports the peace process by (1) financing the UN Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit (UCAH) as well as the provision of humanitarian assistance for dependent families of the quartered former troops; (2) supporting resettlement and job creation programs in both UNITA and GRA areas; and (3) soliciting contributions from other governments.

Areas of focus include:

Demobilization. The Lusaka Protocol called for the quartering of UNITA soldiers and arms, the integration of both forces into a single army under control of the government, and the demobilization of excess former soldiers. In response, 15 sites were established throughout the country for former troops of UNITA to hand over their weapons and remain quartered while waiting to be reintegrated into the FAA or demobilized to their home communities. In 1997, more than 70,000 former UNITA soldiers (ex-FMU) were demobilized. Demobilization is the key to peace in Angola, and this process, although lengthy, had been successful until mid-1998.

Demining. More than three decades of almost constant internal conflict have left Angola with one of the world's most serious land mine problems: estimates vary but all agree that there are millions of landmines in Angola. There are to date more than 70,000 amputees, the majority of whom are women and children. In 1997, USAID-funded mine action programs increased farmer access to more than 6,100 hectares of arable land and rehabilitated 900 land mine survivors through prosthetic and orthopedic programs. Mine awareness programs have saved

hundreds of lives and prevented needless mutilation.

Human Rights. USAID has funded World Learning's training program which brought relief to about 150 prisoners whose human and civil rights were violated when they were incarcerated over the statutory limit. A human rights lawyer who participated in World Learning's training initiated an appeals process in the province of Huambo which resulted in the release of 80 prisoners who had spent years in jail without any charges being filed against them. This success has been having multiplier effects in the provinces of Bie, Huila and Luanda. In addition, with USG support, the Association of Women Jurists brought the issue of women's and children's rights to public and GURN attention through a conference and pamphlet dealing with formerly neglected subjects such as spouse abuse, underage labor, and child prostitution. The Human Rights Division of the Ministry of Justice began slowly to assert its role in monitoring the serious human rights situation in the country. Using the Democracy and Human Rights Fund, we intend to contribute to the revision of Angola's code of criminal procedures, which dates back to 1910. Support to the International Republican Institute and the National Democratic Institute promotes greater participation and respect for civil rights. USG-supported NGOs invited elements of the Angolan National Police to participate in human and civil rights-related seminars, marking the first time the ANP underwent such training.

Other activities by the USG have supported conflict resolution in Angola by focusing on the necessary conditions for the peace process to succeed, such as increasing freedom of movement, promoting and supporting community-identified selfhelp and citizen empowerment activities, increasing the flow of alternative information flows, and assisting the reintegration of ex-combatants. USAID has also been very involved in strengthening the GURN institutions at the national and local level. The USG has supported community self-governance and

rehabilitation and reactivation activities; and increasing the flow of accurate, uncensored news and increasing awareness of the importance of press freedom through training of journalists.

Support was also provided to numerous fora on conflict resolution and peace-keeping related issues, including: training of church officials, NGOs, MPs and government officials to act as community mediators; Department of Defense seminars on civilmilitary relations; a two-week workshop on conflict resolution and media skills for over 60 journalists which introduced the journalists to conflict resolution issues and techniques, and upgraded their conceptual and practical media skills; and a seminar on "Civic Society Building, Democratization, Conflict Resolution, and Peace Building" for 40 UNITA military trainers at a troop camp where the trainers will use the civic education skills learned in the seminar to assist 5,000 soldiers in their transition from bush command posts to civil society.

Diplomatic initiatives by the USG have also played a critical role in Angola's transition process. Ambassador Steinberg meets on a daily basis with the UN Secretary General's Special Representative for Angola, the other ambassadors from the "troika" of Lusaka Peace Protocol observers, and representatives of both parties to the conflict, the Angolan government and the insurgent movement UNITA. Other embassy officials participate in regular Armed Conflict Prevention Group meetings. Our mission to the UN in New York has led Security Council efforts to ensure the most effective multilateral support for the peace process.

A series of high-level USG visitors have also stressed to both government and UNITA the urgent need to complete their peace process obligations and move forward to reconciliation. Secretary Christopher visited in October, 1996, and met with President dos Santos. Secretary Albright met with dos Santos and with UNITA representatives in December, 1997. U.S.

Ambassador to the UN Richardson visited twice in 1997, meeting both with President dos Santos and UNITA leader Savimbi, while Special Envoy Ambassador Paul Hare visited several times to work with Angolan leaders to move the process forward. Much was accomplished during this period (until spring/summer 1998): a Government of Unity and National Reconciliation was formed, including representatives from all political parties, and government control was extended to two-thirds of the districts formerly controlled by UNITA. UNITA was legalized as a political party, and Jonas Savimbi was recognized as the legal head of the largest opposition party.

Conclusions

Overall, there was progress in national reconciliation in 1997. UNITA members elected to the National Assembly during the 1992 elections were incorporated into the legislature. Government of National Unity [GURN] made substantial progress in extending the scope of state administration: almost 85% of the country is now controlled by the state. There were indications of cooperation between erstwhile political opponents - the Government and UNITA administrators. Unfortunately, this progress faded in mid-1998 and it is unclear how the present tension will affect progress that has already been made toward peace and national reconciliation in Angola. The peace process in Angola is fragile, and there are many challenges which have threatened and will continue to threaten progress towards a lasting resolution of this conflict. However, USG assistance in conflict resolution has helped to lay the beginnings of a foundation for achieving the goal of long-term political and economic development in Angola.

D. Conclusions

Conflict and its pervasive effects on the political, economic, and social sectors in Africa remains one of the most

significant obstacles to long-term sustainable development. The USG strongly supports efforts to move these countries from conflict to post-conflict and transition to democratic rule. Recent events in Ethiopia and Eritrea, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, reinforce the need for greater African capacity to prevent and resolve conflict. The United States and other donors believe that support to build African capacity to prevent and resolve conflict is the prerequisite for progress towards sustainable development in Africa, and the means to prevent or minimize backsliding into conflict in post-conflict countries. We recognize that these transitions are vulnerable to many external and internal destabilization forces, of which recurrence of conflict is only one. However, experience has taught us that our activities in conflict mediation and resolution, in coordination with other donors and our development partners, are a critical first step on the path to sustainable economic and political development in Africa.

Annex A - USG Activities in Support of ACRA

1. Improving the Conflict Resolution Capabilities of the Organization of African Unity (OAU).

The State Department provided support to try to link U.S. efforts into, and support ongoing initiatives at, the OAU and subregional levels. The core of our support has been financial support to the OAU mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution. To date the State Department has contributed \$10.37 million towards this goal. In FY1997, \$2.3 million was budgeted towards this effort. This funding has been used in part to establish a Conflict Management Center within the OAU headquarters in Addis Ababa. The Center's current staff of 11 are working on crisis issues throughout the continent.

In addition, the OAU is allocating \$700,000 from this year's budget to fund a USEUCOM-designed, ten-day, comprehensive crisis management exercise at the Center in late April 1998, which will provide a read-out of its capabilities. Our assistance has also been used to equip an OAU 100-man quick reaction military observer force. The OAU has used \$200,000 to fund the deployment of 30 members of this observer force to the Comoros Islands to monitor tensions following an attempt by two of the islands to secede from the Comoros Republic. The OAU also has a 10-person civilian monitoring group in Western Sahara as observers in the run-up to a referendum in that country. From our contributions, the OAU has further granted \$230,000 to the Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) to promote the peace process in Somalia and Sudan. In addition, last year the OAU sent \$100,000 from the U.S. contribution to the peace fund to support the Julius Nyerere-led peace talks on Burundi in Arusha.

2. Improving the Conflict Resolution Capability of Sub-Regional Organizations.

Through the OAU "Peace Fund" (established as a depository for all contributions to the OAU relating to conflict prevention, management and resolution), the USG has supported specific activities such as sub-regional efforts in the Great Lakes, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Sudan.

Department of State supported the Sudan Peace Process The sponsored by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). IGAD members include most governments in East Africa, and U.S. Embassies in almost every country made demarches in support of the IGAD efforts. The USG also contributed funds to facilitate In Somalia, IGAD was engaged in negotiations to resolve continuing conflict in Somalia, and the USG publicly supported these efforts through statements and demarches. Through USAID, IGAD continued its efforts to strengthen African capacity for conflict prevention, mitigation, and response, through the Peace Fund, a quick response conflict management mechanism which facilitates such efforts, such as those in Sudan and Somalia. A Institutional Strengthening and Grantmaking (ISGM) will build the capacity and support regional activities of African NGOs engaged in conflict prevention, mitigation and response.

In 1997, ICITAP, with USG support, trained 500 members of the Liberian National Police (LNP) to prepare them to assist ECOMOG peacekeeping forces in providing security for the national elections which were held in July 1997. Training courses were given on a variety of topics including, "The Role of Police in a Democracy," "Human Dignity," "Defensive Tactics," "Community Policing," and "Media Relations." The training focused on imparting the necessary knowledge and skills to provide security and protection at the voting sites, and also to give the ESP officers the initiative to guide and assist pedestrian traffic and the movement of voters.

3. Improving the Conflict Resolution Capabilities of Non-

Governmental Organizations(NGOs)

In Angola, USAID provided \$150,000 to the Conflict Management Group to support training of church officials, NGOs, MPs and other government officials to act as community mediators. South Africa, support is provided to two NGOs, the African Center for Conciliation and the Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), and Independent Mediation Services of South Africa (IMSSA), strengthen their capacity to conduct conflict resolution training individuals, other members of civil society, and local governments, as well as participate in conflict management and dispute resolution. Support was also provided to local and provincial governments, schools, and communities to establish functioning public mediation structures. In Mozambique, support provided to civil society organizations to assist developing draft Alternative Dispute Resolution legislation. Through the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative (GHAI) support is provided to locally based NGOs in Tanzania involved in conflict resolution on a regional level.

4. Supporting African Demobilization and Retraining Efforts.

In Angola, USAID support was provided for demobilization efforts with the result that in 1997, more than 70,000 former UNITA soldiers (ex-FMU) were demobilized. As of March 23, 1998, additional 5,000 ex-FMU have been demobilized without being quartered and 1,000 ex-FMU in special categories (police, Commission deminers. and Joint delegates) in are the demobilization process. In addition, in 1997, USAID-funded mine action programs increased farmer access to more than hectares of arable land and rehabilitated 900 landmine survivors through prosthetic and orthopedic programs. USAID has participated actively in the demobilization process, as a Troika observer at the Joint Commission and as a funding agency.

5. Training for Africans in Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping.

The African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) is an initiative to build African capacity by training line battalions and providing non-lethal equipment for potential operations in peacekeeping or complex humanitarian crises. The mandate for such operations could come from a regional or sub-regional organization (OAU, SADC, ECOWAS), the United Nations, or a multi-national coalition. the U.S. offers training Through the ACRI program, equipment to African countries with a commitment to peacekeeping and in which the military accepts the supremacy of democratic, civilian government. This complements capacity enhancement efforts of several other countries such as Britain, France, and FΥ 1997, the Nordic states. For ACRI is on programmatically. At the conclusion of FY 1998, the initiative will have provided six ACRI partner countries (Senegal, Mali, Uganda, Ghana, Malawi, and Benin) with interoperable communications and other peacekeeping support equipment (all non-lethal), completed initial training and initiated sustainment training with six battalions.

The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), through the United Nations Development Program's (UNDP) proposed Programme for Coordination and Assistance on Security and Development (PCASED), supported a joint initiative with Mali on small arms control. ACDA sent representatives to Bamako for the "Week of Peace" program in March, where they distributed advocating West African participation in the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, and provided a model Light and Small Arms Registry with technical specifications. The USG, through ACDA, has worked to promote awareness and support for PCASED, which is a West African initiative designed to address all serious regional security threats at levels, which compliments and reinforces development aims in the region.

In December 1997, the USG participated in the initial meeting of the African Peacekeeping Support Group held in New York and attended by 80 member states to exchange information on initiatives to enhance African peacekeeping and humanitarian relief capacities.

B. Department of Defense Report on Humanitarian Assistance Activities in FY1997